Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

2006

Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition
Avishalom Tor
Notre Dame Law School, atortest@nd.edu

Stephen M. Garcia
Richard Gonzalez

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia & Richard Gonzalez, Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition, 32
Pers. & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 970 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/692

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin
http://psp.sagepub.com/

Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition
Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor and Richard Gonzalez
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2006 32: 970
DOI: 10.1177/0146167206287640
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://psp.sagepub.com/content/32/7/970

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Society for Personality and Social Psychology

Additional services and information for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://psp.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://psp.sagepub.com/content/32/7/970.refs.html

>> Version of Record - May 31, 2006
What is This?

Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at UNIV OF NOTRE DAME on October 14, 2013

Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition
Stephen M. Garcia
University of Michigan
Avishalom Tor
University of Haifa
Richard Gonzalez
University of Michigan
Social comparison theories typically imply a comparable degree of
competition between commensurate rivals who are competing on a
mutually important dimension. However, the present analysis
reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends
on their proximity to a meaningful standard. Studies 1 to 3 test
the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less
willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their
commensurate rivals are highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than
when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Studies 4 to 6 then generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition also
increases in the proximity of other meaningful standards, such as
the bottom of a ranking scale or a qualitative threshold in the middle of a scale. Studies 7 and 8 further examine the psychological
processes underlying this phenomenon and reveal that proximity
to a standard exerts a direct impact on the basic unidirectional
drive upward, beyond the established effects of commensurability
and dimension relevance.

the social comparison process (Festinger, 1942, 1954;
Hoffman, Festinger, & Lawrence, 1954; Tesser, 1988;
Whittemore, 1924, 1925)—has generally been assumed
to be greatest among rivals with commensurate attributes
on a relevant dimension (Goethals, 1986; Goethals &
Darley, 1977; Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999). However,
we propose that competitive behavior intensifies when
rivals have high rankings (e.g., #2 vs. #3) compared to
intermediate ones (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Moreover, this
increased competition among highly ranked rivals
signifies a more general phenomenon—a tendency for
competition among commensurate rivals on a relevant
dimension to intensify in the proximity of a meaningful
standard. Such standards are not limited to high rankings (e.g., “the top” standard) but also may include
rankings that coincide with a bottom or qualitative
threshold in the middle of such a scale (e.g., #500 on
the Fortune 500 vs. #501—just off it).
From The Financial Times to Billboard, Forbes, The Wall
Street Journal, and U.S. News & World Report, rankings
permeate our popular culture, and the present analysis
uses the ranking context to advance our understanding

Keywords: competition; social comparison; decision making; social
capital; behavioral economics; choice behavior

“F

irst one to the tree is the COOLEST-PERSON-INTHE-WORLD!” A herd of children then stampede toward
the tree. Another stampede transpires when one of them
shouts, “Last one there is a ROTTEN EGG!” The structure of these childhood games tell us something interesting about the dynamics of competition: Competition
is not equally distributed among the racing children. In
the former race, the children closest to the tree will be
more likely than their farther-behind counterparts to tug
and pull at each other’s clothing to preempt their competitors from getting to the tree first. Similarly, in the latter race, the children lagging behind, the would-be
rotten eggs, will be likely to act more competitively than
those farther ahead. Competition—a manifestation of
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of the social comparison process. In doing so, the current studies also build on the choice literature that
found individuals willingly trade off social comparison
concerns (e.g., disadvantageous inequality) for profit
(Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Bazerman,
White, & Loewenstein, 1995; Blount & Bazerman, 1996).
We qualify this finding, however, by revealing that such
trade-offs become more difficult and less likely for rankings in the proximity of a meaningful standard than for
rankings farther away from a standard.
Social Comparison and Competition
An upward comparison of the self to someone else
who is better on a valued dimension can be especially
painful and foster competitive behavior (Brickman
& Bulman, 1977; Tesser, 1988; Tesser, Felson, & Suls,
2000). In Festinger’s (1954) words, “competitive behavior, action to protect one’s superiority, and even some
kinds of behavior that might be called cooperative, are
manifestations in the social process of these pressures”
(p. 126) to reduce such discrepancies. For example, in
a classic experiment (Hoffman et al., 1954), after one
participant in a group of three began scoring considerably well on a performance task, the other two began to
act in ways aimed at preventing the higher scorer from
gaining additional points. Such competitive behavior
served to reduce the relative differences in performance between the higher scorer and the lower ones.
For competition to occur, however, the social comparison must be important to the self, and one significant factor that makes social comparisons important to
the self is the relevance of the dimension at hand. The
Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Beach & Tesser,
2000; Tesser, 1988), for instance, reminds us that not all
upward comparisons are painful. Only when the dimension is relevant to the self will the upward comparison
be painful and increase competitive behavior. For
example, Tesser and Smith (1980) paired acquainted
or unacquainted individuals in an interactive word
identification task and told them task performance was
either relevant or irrelevant to a valued dimension—
verbal skill. Results showed that participants who
thought performance was relevant to their own verbal
skill gave more difficult clues to their partners than did
participants who thought that performance was irrelevant. As Tesser (1988) explains, “when the task is relevant and another’s performance threatens to surpass
our own, we may take action to prevent that from happening” (p. 444). Competition therefore increases when
the dimension is relevant to the self.
Another significant factor that makes social comparison important to the self is the commensurability of
the reference person. According to the related attributes
hypothesis (Goethals & Darley, 1977; see Suls & Wheeler,
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2000), we have a tendency to choose a reference person
who is “close to one’s own performance or opinion,
given his standing on characteristics related to and predictive of performance or opinion” (Goethals & Darley,
1977, p. 265). The reference person is someone with similar characteristics as the self, and this reference person
keeps the self motivated to perform just as well, if not
better, than this commensurate other.
Thus, according to both the Self-Evaluation Maintenance Model (Tesser, 1988) and the related attributes
hypothesis (Goethals & Darley, 1977), social comparison
on a mutually relevant dimension (e.g., profit) with a
commensurate counterpart (e.g., rival) generates competition. We propose, however, that rankings provide
important contextual information about an additional
significant factor that can moderate competition even
when the dimension is highly relevant and the reference
person, or rival, is commensurate. Moreover, we suggest
that this effect impacts competition directly via a basic
drive underlying social comparison of performance—
the unidirectional drive upward (Festinger, 1954).
Proximity to a Standard and the Unidirectional Drive
Festinger (1954) posits that “there is a unidirectional
drive upward in the case of abilities which is largely
absent in opinions” (p. 124). This drive is premised on
the existence of an obvious, basic, and ubiquitous standard, namely, the top. For clarity, we take our definition
of standard from the dictionary: “An acknowledged
measure of comparison for quantitative or qualitative
value; a criterion” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, 2000). In the typical case, higher is
better because high rankings convey one’s proximity to
the standard of reaching the top (e.g., self and rival
ranked #2 and #3).
However, if the presence of a standard drives social
comparison, we might expect the unidirectional drive
upward to become even stronger in the proximity of
the standard, that is, near the top. In this case, rivals
with high rankings would behave more competitively,
whereas rivals with intermediate rankings (e.g., #202 vs.
#203), far from the standard, will behave less competitively. Furthermore, if high rankings signify one’s proximity to the top and thereby amplify competition, then
other rankings that signify a standard also should increase
competition. For instance, competition also should
increase where there is a cost to being ranked last, or to
the extent that one’s rank may not meet a given standard in the middle of the ranking scale. Contrary to the
view implied by previous research (e.g., Goethals &
Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988), competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension is
not static but rather dynamic, fluctuating as a function
of self-other ranking information.
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Whereas previous research on the rank-order
paradigm primarily used rankings to measure comparison selection (Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler, 1966),
we use rankings to ensure rivals’ commensurability and
vary the rivals’ distance from the standard, ergo the unidirectional drive. By manipulating the very unidirectional drive on which social comparison is based, the
present analysis makes two important contributions:
showing (a) that high rankings can increase competition between rivals to a greater extent than intermediate rankings because high rankings signify proximity to
the top and (b) that this high-ranking effect represents
a more general phenomenon, occurring wherever
rankings coincide with other standards.
Overview
Using multiple measures of competition, we predicted
that people would become averse to trading disadvantageous inequality for extra profit (e.g., an unequal
allocation that puts the decision maker at a disadvantage compared to another recipient), rate the pain of
social comparison as being greater, and report more
intense feelings of competition when they and their
rivals’ rankings were proximate to a valued standard
(e.g., high rankings) than when they were not (e.g.,
intermediate rankings). To ensure rivals’ commensurability (Goethals & Darley, 1977), paired rivals always
occupied two contiguous ranks (e.g., #n vs. #n+1). We
also focus only on dimensions that are mutually relevant
to the rivals in the context at hand, without manipulating relevance. Using a decision-making methodology,
Studies 1 to 3 demonstrate that competition intensifies
with high rankings, Studies 4 to 6 generalize this effect
to other rankings that signify a standard, and Studies
7 and 8 measured the unidirectional drive upward.
STUDY 1

One common measure of competition in the payoffs and profit maximization literature (e.g., Axelrod
& Dion, 1988; Brickman, 1975; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978;
Messick & Sentis, 1979; Messick & Thorngate, 1967;
Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) is the trade-off between
profit and disadvantageous inequality (Bazerman et al.,
1992, 1995; Bazerman, Schroth, Shah, Diekmann, &
Tenbrunsel, 1994; Blount & Bazerman, 1996; Garcia,
Tor, Bazerman, & Miller, 2005), where participants choose
between an equal amount as another individual (e.g.,
self: $500, other: $500) or a more lucrative but disadvantageously unequal amount (e.g., self: $600, other:
$800). The implication of choosing this latter pay-off is
that individuals willingly forgo social comparison concerns for extra profit (Bazerman et al., 1992), whereas

the more competitive strategy is to choose the former
suboptimal equal pay-off.
We predicted that more individuals in the highrankings condition than in the intermediate rankings
condition would choose a less lucrative but equal payoff (e.g., 5% self, 5% other) over a more lucrative but
disadvantageously unequal one (7% self, 25% other).
We also included a control condition (Wheeler, 2000)
where no ranking information was provided. If the control condition were to produce results akin to the intermediate rankings condition, we could infer that the
high rankings amplify competition, as predicted. If it
were to resemble the high rankings condition, on the
other hand, we could infer that intermediate rankings
somehow deflate competition.
Participants
A total of 162 undergraduates (85 women, 77 men)
from two midwestern universities received $8 for completing a 45-min survey packet or volunteered at the
library.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, the high rankings and
intermediate rankings conditions were titled “Top 500
Nonprofits” and read as follows:
Imagine that you are the CEO of a nonprofit organization that is ranked #1 [#101] in donation earnings. You
are thinking about a fundraising joint venture with
another nonprofit organization that is ranked #2
[#102]. Income from donations will depend on
whether or not you enter the joint venture. Strategy A:
Without a joint venture, your nonprofit organization’s
donations will increase by 5% and the other nonprofit’s
donations will increase by 5%—OR—Strategy B: With a
joint venture, your nonprofit organization’s donations
will increase by 7% and the other nonprofit’s donations
will increase by 25%.

Participants were then asked to choose one option. The
control condition simply omitted ranking information
on donation earnings.
Results and Discussion
To test the prediction that high rankings amplify competition relative to intermediate rankings (and the control condition), we performed a binary logistic
regression by using the following contrast: 2 (high rankings), −1 (intermediate rankings), and −1 (control). This
contrast was significant (B = −.46, Wald = 13.2, p < .001),
suggesting that the high rankings condition significantly differed from the average of both intermediate
rankings and the control. Only 54% in the high rankings
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condition (n = 50) maximized profit compared to 79%
in the intermediate ranking condition (n = 56) and
86% in the control condition (n = 56). We also conducted follow-up individual comparisons in the context
of their own set of orthogonal regressions. As predicted, a significant contrast emerged between the high
and intermediate rankings (1, −1, 0: B = −.57, Wald = 7.0,
p < .01), controlling for its orthogonal pair (1, 1, −2:
B = −.35, Wald = 5.9, p < .05). Moreover, as expected, the
contrast between the intermediate rankings and control
was not significant (0, 1, −1: B = −.25, Wald = .96, p > .32),
controlling for the orthogonal one (2, −1, −1: B = −.46,
Wald = .13.4, p < .001).
Because the data from the control condition were
much closer to the intermediate ranking condition
than to the high ranking condition, the implication is
that high rankings enhanced the social comparison
process. Furthermore, the effect of rankings on competition transpired, although ranking information
was arguably irrelevant to the nonprofit organization’s
goal of maximizing donation income. Indeed, the
participants recognized this fact because a majority
maximized joint gains across all conditions. Even so,
the high rankings condition augmented social comparison concerns sufficiently to make the trade-off
between disadvantageous inequality and profit a bit
more difficult.
STUDY 2

Although high rankings appear to amplify social
comparison, one possible explanation is that individuals in the high rankings condition of Study 1 chose
suboptimal rates of donation growth to preserve the visibility of their nonprofit organization. Hence, their
choice could be a profit-maximizing choice in the
longer term that takes into account visibility effects
instead of the result of competitive feelings brought
about by social comparison per se. Study 2 addressed
this issue by removing the choice of pay-offs and simply
asking participants how competitive they would behave
toward their rival. Study 2 also lowered the rankings in
the high rankings condition to show that proximity to
the top, instead of actually being at the top, suffices to
generate the effect. To link the choice results in Study
1 directly to social comparison, Study 2 also captured ratings of the pain of social comparison (Bazerman et al.,
1992; Brickman & Bulman, 1977).
Participants
A total of 49 undergraduates (22 women, 27 men) at
a midwestern university received $8 for completing a
45-min packet of surveys.
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Procedure
Participants read, “Imagine that you are the CEO of
a nonprofit organization. You are thinking about a
fundraising joint venture with a rival nonprofit organization. Income from donations will depend on whether
or not you enter the joint venture.” High and intermediate rankings contexts were presented randomly:
“Suppose that you have the #9 [#209] rank title in
donations earnings and the other nonprofit has the
#10 [#210] rank title.” Two questions followed each context, “How competitive would you feel toward the other
nonprofit? (1 = not competitive, 7 = very competitive)” and
“How painful would it be if the other nonprofit surpassed you in the rankings? (1 = painless, 7 = painful).
Results and Discussion
As predicted, individuals indicated that they would feel
more competitive toward the rival nonprofit when they
were ranked #9 and the rival nonprofit #10 (M = 4.37,
SD = 1.85) than when ranked #209 and the rival #210
(M = 3.65, SD = 1.81), F(1, 48) = 13.3, p < .01. Individuals
similarly indicated that they would feel more pain knowing that their rival surpassed them in the context of high
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.80) versus intermediate rankings (M =
3.35, SD = 1.63), F(1, 48) = 12.9, p < .01. The correlation
between competitiveness and the pain of social comparison was highly significant in the high (r = .68, p < .001) and
intermediate rankings (r = .71, p < .001) conditions alike.
Taken together, these results buttress the social comparison account, namely, that highly ranked rivals who are
proximate to the top standard feel more competitive and
anticipate more social comparison pain, as compared to
rivals ranked farther away from this standard.
STUDY 3

Whereas Studies 1 and 2 suggest that high rankings
intensify competition relative to intermediate ones,
Study 3 directly tested the hypothesis that competition
increases with the proximity to the top, following our
claim that the unidirectional drive upward intensifies as
a function of this proximity. Study 3 tested this prediction systematically by varying the rivals’ distance from
the standard. Study 3 also used a within-subjects design
to underscore the strength of individual decision makers’ preferences because some researchers feel that
such designs enable individuals to make more consistent decisions (Camerer, 1995).
Participants
A total of 30 undergraduates at a midwestern university responded to an e-mail invitation for an online
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study. A total of 100 randomly selected e-mail addresses
from the undergraduate student directory were e-mailed
but a few bounced back, yielding an approximate response
rate of 30%. All online participants volunteered; they
did not receive course credit or pay. We also note that
online data collections for decision-making experiments tend to produce similar results as in-person ones
(Birnbaum, 1999), with the added benefit of capturing a
more diverse sample (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).

100%
80%
Percentage
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60%
40%
20%

Procedure
In a within-subjects design, participants read about a
poker tournament:
Imagine that you are playing in a 1-day poker tournament with 500 players. For the final round, you are
deciding whether or not to team up with one of your
rivals. Strategy A: If you play solo, your tournament
earnings will increase by 5% and your rival’s by 5%—
OR—Strategy B: If you play as a team, your tournament
earnings will increase by 10% and your rival’s by 25%.

Participants were then asked, “In the following cases,
which strategy would you pursue?” Participants then
read verbatim, “Before the final round, you are ranked
#3 in tournament earnings and your rival is ranked #4 . . .”
and then indicated their strategy. Participants responded
to four randomly presented iterations of the same question that varied the rankings (self vs. rival): #3 vs. #4,
#6 vs. #7, #12 vs. #13, and #24 vs. #25.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a Generalized Estimating Equations
(GEE) analysis1 to test the prediction that competitive
behavior would increase with the rivals’ proximity to
the top standard. The score statistic for the GEE analysis was significant, χ2(3) = 15.81, p < .01. We then conducted a linear contrast with the following weights: −3
(3 vs. 4), −1 (6 vs. 7), 1 (12 vs. 13), and 3 (24 vs. 25). This
predicted linear pattern was significant, χ2(1) = 14.02,
p < .001, whereas the two orthogonal patterns were not
(quadratic: 1,−1,−1, 1), χ2(1) = 1.84, p = .18 (cubic: −1, 3,
−3, 1), χ2(1) = .84, p = .36. Only 20% maximized joint
gains when ranked #3 and their rival #4, compared to
23% when ranked #6 and rival #7, 47% when ranked
#12 and rival #13, and 70% when ranked #24 and rival
#25 (see Figure 1). Thus, Study 3 supports the prediction that competition increases as the rivals become
increasingly proximate to the top standard.

0%
#3 vs #4

#6 vs #7

#12 vs #13

#24 vs #25

Ranks

Figure 1 Poker: Percentage maximizing joint gains by rankings.

competition grows increasingly stronger as rivals become
more proximate to the top standard. However, we argued
that high rankings should intensify competition because
they indicate how far one is from a standard. Therefore,
if this standard-based model is true, as Studies 1 to 3 suggest, then other rankings that signify a standard should
likewise amplify competition compared to rankings that
do not. Incidentally, this predicted pattern is somewhat
reminiscent of the striking finding that bronze medalists
are happier than silver ones (Medvec, Madley, & Gilovich,
1995). However, the present analysis focuses on social
comparison and competition, whereas the medalist study
focused on counterfactual thinking (e.g., Roese &
Olson, 1993) following a competition.
Thus, Study 4 tested the prediction that competition
will be greater when the rivals had either high rankings
or bottom rankings that coincide with a valued standard, compared to intermediate rankings. Because previous research (Smith & Insko, 1987) suggests that
academic achievement is an important dimension to
our participant pool (i.e., students), Study 4 manipulated one’s rank at a university as an indicator of academic achievement. Using class rankings, we tested the
prediction that those who are proximate to an academic standard (ranked top or last in the class) would
behave more competitively than those who are not
proximate to one of these standards (e.g., ranked in the
middle).
STUDY 4

Beyond High Rankings

Participants

Studies 1 to 3 show that high rankings intensify
competition relative to intermediate rankings and that

A total of 68 undergraduates at a midwestern university participated in an online study, and the recruiting
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process is described in Study 3. Two hundred e-mails
were sent and the response rate was approximately 34%.

100%

Procedure

Imagine that you are studying for a final exam that is
worth half of your grade and you are deciding whether
to study with another classmate. Your decision will
directly affect your performance on the final exam and
indirectly affect your final grade in the course, cumulative GPA, and rank at the University.

Three questions varied the rivals’ rankings and were
randomly presented in a within-subjects design:
Suppose that you are ranked #5 [#101] [#499] out of
500 at a university and the other classmate is ranked #6
[#102] [#500]. What would be your decision? Study
Alone: Your percentage on the final will increase by 5%
and the classmate’s by 5%—OR—Study with Classmate:
Your percentage on the final will increase by 10% and
the classmate’s by 20%.

Results and Discussion
Results from a GEE analysis supported the prediction
that participants would prefer a more competitive strategy when the self and rival were ranked highly or at the
bottom of the class than when ranked in the middle. The
score statistic for the GEE analysis was significant, χ2(2) =
17.22, p < .001. We also conducted a follow-up contrast
analysis with the following weights to test this quadratic
pattern: 1 (high rankings condition), −2 (intermediate rankings condition), and 1 (bottom rankings condition). The predicted quadratic pattern was significant, χ2(1) = 17.02,
p < .001, whereas the orthogonal linear pattern was not
(−1, 0, 1), χ2(1) = 2.13, p = .14, suggesting that the intermediate rankings condition significantly differed from
the high and bottom rankings conditions, which did not
significantly differ from each other. A total of 59% in the
high ranking, 81% in the intermediate ranking, and 69%
in the bottom ranking conditions maximized exam percentage points (see Figure 2). Thus, it appears that rankings exert their effect through the standards they signify
because the social comparison process intensified when
a bottom ranking coincides with the standard of being
last in the class.
STUDY 5

Although Study 4 supports our standard-based model,
one might argue that social comparison concerns only

80%
Percentage

Participants read the following:
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60%

40%

20%
#5 vs #6

#101 vs #102

#499 vs #500

Ranks

Figure 2 Class rank: Percentage maximizing joint gains by rankings.

increase at the endpoints of a distribution, a possible
implication of range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965,
1995). Accordingly, Study 5 used the setting of the
Fortune 500, which is only a segment (Top 500) of the
entire distribution of publicly traded companies. We
predicted that competition would be greatest when
rivals were ranked #3 and #4 and when ranked #500
and #501 (off the list), compared to ranks of #103 and
#104. To illustrate the robustness of the effect, Study 5
also measured competition with a flipped trade-off
where profit was coupled with equality and the unequal
pay-off was advantageous but less lucrative.
Participants
A total of 72 undergraduates (33 women, 39 men)
at two midwestern universities were recruited at the
library and volunteered to participate in a brief study.
Research assistants targeted students who were studying
by themselves and the response rate was generally very
high (approximately 90%). Groups of students were
always avoided becaus e of the tendency for study groups
to confer and compare their responses during the task.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants in the high,
intermediate, and bottom rankings conditions read,
Imagine that you are the CEO of a company that is
ranked #3 [#103] [#500] on the prestigious Fortune 500
and you are thinking about a possible joint venture with
a rival company ranked #4 [#104] [#501, just off the
list]. Profits will depend on whether or not you enter a
joint venture.

Participants then chose “Strategy A: Without a joint
venture, your company’s profits will increase by 5% and
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100%

Percentage

80%

60%

40%

20%
#3 vs #4

#103 vs #104

#500 vs #501

Ranks

Figure 3 Fortune 500: Percentage maximizing joint gains by rankings.

your rival’s profits will increase by 1%.” or “Strategy B:
With a joint venture, your company’s profits will increase
by 6% and your rival’s profits will increase by 6%.”
Results and Discussion
To test the prediction that competition would be
greater among rivals ranked #3 and #4 and #500 and
#501 (just off the Fortune 500), compared to rivals ranked
#103 and #104, we performed a binary logistic regression by using the following contrast: 1 (high rankings),
−2 (intermediate rankings), and 1 (bottom rankings). The
contrast was significant (B = −.53, Wald = 7.5, p < .01),
suggesting that the high rankings condition significantly differed from the intermediate rankings condition but not from the bottom rankings condition. Only
39% of the participants in the high rankings condition
(n = 26) and 50% of the participants in the bottom rankings condition (n = 22) chose the more profitmaximizing, equal pay-off, compared to 79% in the intermediate rankings condition (n = 24, see Figure 3). We
also conducted follow-up individual comparisons in the
context of their own set of orthogonal regressions. As
predicted, a significant contrast emerged between the
high and intermediate rankings conditions (1, −1, 0:
B = −.90, Wald = 7.8, p < .01), controlling for the orthogonal contrast (1, 1, −2: B = .14, Wald = .66, p = .41). The
contrast between the intermediate and bottom rankings
also was significant (0, 1, −1: B = .67, Wald = 4.1, p < .05),
controlling for the orthogonal one (2, −1, −1: B = −.38,
Wald = 4.8, p < .05).
Thus, competition also can increase when a bottom
ranking coincides with a standard—in this case, just
missing the Fortune 500 criterion—showing again that
the ranking effect is not about high rankings alone.

This data pattern also refutes a psychophysical counterexplanation for the effect found here. Psychophysics
research (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Volkmann, 1936;
Zipf, 1949) suggests that a one-unit distance between
the contiguous ranks of #3 and #4 may seem much
larger than a one-unit distance between a ranking of
#103 and #104. Hence, one might argue that perhaps
competition only increases amid high rankings where
the difference is greater. Yet, as Study 5 (and Study 4)
suggest, this psychophysical account alone cannot
explain this ranking effect because the difference
between the ranking of #500 and #501 is actually
smaller than the ranking of #103 and #104 yet is a point
of increased, not decreased, competition. Again, the
standard matters, not the ranking per se.
STUDY 6

Study 5 also implies, however, that competition can
increase even amid intermediate rankings because the
bottom rank of #500 of the Fortune 500 is also intermediate with regard to the rest of the population (or even
the Fortune 1000). Because Study 5, however, did not
make this characteristic of the Fortune 500 explicit, participants may have implicitly considered the list to be a
complete distribution rather than a segment thereof.
Study 6 thus seeks to underscore that the location of
the ranking on the scale—top, bottom, or somewhere
in the middle—is incidental; what matters is whether
that ranking signifies a standard. In Study 6, we therefore tested the prediction that competition increases in
the proximity of any valued standard, regardless of its
overall rank.
Participants
A total of 73 undergraduates at a midwestern university participated in an online survey, and the recruiting process is described in Study 3. Two hundred
e-mails were sent and the response rate was approximately 36%.
Procedure
Participants were assigned to one of three betweensubjects conditions. Participants in the Top 100 Get
Bonus Condition read, “Imagine that you are playing in
a 1-day poker tournament with 500 players. Everyone
who finishes in the Top 100 gets a $100 bonus.” Then,
all participants in this condition answered three randomly presented questions, “Suppose that, before the
final round, you are ranked #2 [#50] [#100] in tournament earnings and your rival is ranked #3 [#51] [#101,
just outside the bonus cutoff]. How competitive would
you feel toward the rival?” At this point, participants
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TABLE 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Cell Sizes for Competitive Feelings by Condition and Rank
Rank
Top 100 Get Bonus Condition

Top 200 Control Condition

Top 200 Get Bonus Condition

#2 Vs. 3

#50 Vs. 51

#100 Vs. 101

#200 Vs. 201

5.14
(2.06)
21
5.59
(1.65)
27
5.64
(1.50)
25

4.29
(1.77)
21
4.59
(1.72)
27
—

6.05
(1.28)
21
4.33
(1.80)
27
4.16
(1.72)
25

—

indicated their response on a 7-point scale (1 = not competitive, 7 = very competitive).
Participants in the Top 200 Control Condition read
the identical scenario, except, “Everyone who finishes
in the Top 200 gets a $100 bonus.” In this condition,
being ranked #100 and the rival #101 was well within
the bonus area. Participants in the Top 200 Get Bonus
Condition read the identical scenario as the Top 200
Control Condition, except that the rankings were modified. The self was ranked #2 [#100] [#200] and the
rival was ranked #3 [#101] [#201, just outside the bonus
cutoff].
Results and Discussion
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to test
the predicted Context × Rank interaction on the
reported competitive feelings. The within-subjects factor of Rank was significant, F(2, 140) = 16.2, p < .001,
whereas the between-subjects factor of Context was not,
F(2, 70) = .54, p = .59. However, as predicted, the
Context × Rank interaction was significant, F(4, 140) =
6.17, p < .001), suggesting that the standard determines
whether the ranking incites feeling of competitiveness
(see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
In the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition, a U-shaped
pattern emerged. Participants expressed feeling more
competitive when ranked highly (#2 vs. #3) and when
ranked at the bonus standard (#100 vs. #101, just outside the bonus cutoff) compared to when ranked in the
middle (#50 vs. #51). Thus, when a standard is at hand
(e.g., missing the bonus cutoff), competition increases.
The Top 200 Control Condition showed a different pattern. Because being ranked #100 with a rival ranked
#101 was well within the bonus standard, participants
expressed lower levels of competition in this ranking
position. Finally, participants in the Top 200 Get
Bonus Condition showed the same pattern of results as
those in the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition. Participants
expressed feeling more competitive when ranked #2

—

5.72
(1.54)
25

and rival #3 and when #200 and rival #201, just outside
the bonus cutoff, compared to when ranked #100 and
rival #101.
Thus, the standard, not the location of the ranking,
determines competition. The very rankings that were a
point of contention in the Top 100 Bonus Condition
(#100 vs. #101) became a point of cooperation in the
other two conditions, and planned comparisons indeed
confirmed this pattern. Competition was significantly
greater when participants were ranked #100 and the
rival #101 in the Top 100 Get Bonus Condition than in
the Top 200 Control Condition, t(46) = 3.70, p < .01,
and the Top 200 Get Bonus Condition, t(44) = 4.14,
p < .001, which did not significantly differ from each
other, t(50) = .35, p = .73. Moreover, because these
rankings were assigned from a tournament population
pool of 500, we also can infer that competitive feelings
do not always subside with intermediate rankings
because standards placed amid intermediate rankings
also can amplify competition. Study 6 therefore further
underscores that wherever the standard is, even in the
middle of a distribution, competition will intensify. Put
differently, what matters most is the location of the standard and proximity to the standard; the ordinal rank
itself is incidental.
The Ever-Increasing Upward Drive
Across multiple measures of competition (e.g., the
choice between profit and disadvantageous inequality,
the choice between profit and advantageous inequality,
the pain of social comparison ratings, and feelings of
competition), the preceding studies showed consistently not only that competition increases with high
rankings but also that this high ranking effect is a more
general phenomenon. Any rankings that signify a standard will amplify competition. But what is it about standards that increase competitive concerns? We thus
begin to address the question of the underlying psychological mechanism.
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Although previous research suggests that competition is greatest when the dimension and reference
person are, respectively, relevant and commensurate to
the self (e.g., Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988), that
research assumes that “unidirectional drive upward” is
fixed under these circumstances. The present analysis,
however, calibrates the strength of this drive by manipulating the rivals’ distance from the standard, holding
constant the relevance of the dimension and commensurability of the rivals. According to the proposed model,
the motivational drive upward, namely, the importance
of doing well, becomes increasingly stronger as rivals
approach a standard.
It is possible, however, that standards do not affect the
motivational drive upward directly but rather do so indirectly by affecting the perceived commensurability of
rivals. Although contiguous ranks were assigned to guarantee commensurability, contiguous ranks at different
locations on the ranking scale may not all be equally
commensurable. Specifically, a social comparison perspective (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988) might
suggest that rivals who are proximate to a standard are
perceived to be more commensurate (e.g., #2 and #3)
than rivals further away from the standard (e.g., #202
and #203). On the other hand, a possible extension of
the psychophysics research described above (Sherif &
Hovland, 1961; Volkmann, 1936; Zipf, 1949) might lead
to the opposite prediction, namely, that competition
increases in the proximity of a standard because differences between contiguous ranks are perceived to be
greater than among less-proximate rankings.
Significantly, Studies 4 to 6 showed that a pure psychophysics mechanism (i.e., in relation to the top of
the ranking scale) cannot account for the effect of standards on competition. Nevertheless, the possible extension of the psychophysical intuition to the more
general case of standards leads to a prediction diametrically opposed to the traditional social comparison
account. The latter, social comparison account, would
propose increased commensurability of rivals (or
decreased differences between them) in the proximity
of standards as a potential mediator of the effect of
proximity on competition. The psychophysics account,
on the other hand, would propose increased differences between rivals (or their decreased commensurability) in the proximity of standards as a potential
mediator of the standard effect.
Studies 7 and 8 therefore begin to explore the psychological mechanism underlying the effect of proximity to a standard on the unidirectional drive upward.
Specifically, we examine whether this effect is mediated
directly by the importance of doing well or indirectly
through the perceived commensurability (either
increasing or decreasing) of the rivals.

STUDY 7

Study 7 measured both the importance of doing well
and the perceived difference in rank. The prediction
was that high rankings, relative to intermediate ones,
would be associated with an increase in the importance
of doing well regardless of perceived difference in commensurability.
Participants
A total of 34 full-time employees (10 women,
24 men) concurrently enrolled in a part-time master’s
of business administration (MBA) program at a
midwestern university participated in a questionnaire
study as part of a class exercise. All those in attendance
participated.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were
assigned to either a high rankings or intermediate rankings condition. Participants read a modified version of
the Fortune 500 scenario:
Imagine that you are the CEO of a Fortune 500 company.
Your company is currently ranked #5 [#405] and you
are thinking about whether or not to enter a lucrative
joint venture with your archrival whose company is
ranked #6 [#406].

Participants were given no information, regarding payoffs or otherwise. Participants then responded to two
questions about the importance of doing well (“How
important is it for you to out-compete your archrival?”
1 = not important, 7 = very important) and the perceived
difference in rank (“So your company’s rank is #5 [#405]
and your rival’s company is #6 [#406]. How big is the
difference in rank?” 1 = small, 7 = large).
Results and Discussion
A MANOVA was conducted on the importance and
difference variables by condition. Results showed that
participants in the high rankings condition felt that it
was significantly more important to out-compete one’s
rival (M = 5.33, SD = 1.40) than did participants in the
intermediate rankings condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.78),
F(1, 32) = 10.4, p < .01. As for the difference variable,
participants in the high rankings condition (M = 2.40,
SD = 1.55) were not significantly different from those in
the intermediate rankings condition (M = 2.53, SD =
1.84), F(1, 32) = .05, p = .83. Thus, the implication is
that high rankings, signaling proximity to the standard,
underscored the importance of doing well; no support
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was found for the perceived difference in rank. In fact,
even when we control for difference as a covariate
variable, the high rankings condition is still significantly different on the importance measure from
the intermediate rankings condition, F(1, 31) = 14.2,
p < .01.
Incidentally, these results also corroborate our operationalization of commensurability as contiguity of
ranks. Here, whether one is ranked highly or intermediately, the perceived difference in rank does not vary,
at least not in this between-subjects design. However,
one could still argue that the difference account might
still play a significant role where people can readily
compare differences between high and intermediate
rankings (Bazerman et al., 1992; Camerer, 1995; Hsee,
Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999), which make
the difference account more transparent. Thus, whereas
Study 7 linked the importance of doing well and proximity to the standard in the absence of any significant
change in the perceived commensurability of the rivals,
Study 8 used a within-subjects design to test whether the
availability of a comparison between different ranking
position leads to changes in perceived commensurability that, in turn, also might mediate the effect of proximity to a standard on competition.
STUDY 8

Study 8 used a within-subjects design where participants could readily compare the difference between
high and intermediate rankings. We asked participants
to respond to a question about competition on a scale
that ranged from cooperative to competitive (slightly
different from the strictly competitive measure used in
Studies 2 and 6) along with questions about the importance of doing well and the perceived difference in
rank. In addition, instead of always having people one
rank above their rival, we also included a reciprocal
control condition where people are one rank below
their, still commensurate, rival. We predicted that the
importance of doing well, even when controlling for
the perceived difference in commensurability, would be
directly related to competitive behavior. No significant
differences were predicted for being ranked one above
or below the rival.
Participants
A total of 84 undergraduates (49 women, 35 men)
participated at a midwestern university. Participants
were recruited at the library and asked to volunteer for
a brief questionnaire.
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Procedure
In a within-subjects design, participants read about
having high rankings on the first page,
Imagine that you are a rock star, and you are ranked #3
out of 500 in sales revenue according to Rolling Stones
Magazine. Imagine further that you are deciding whether
or not to do a duet album with your archrival: a rock
star who is ranked #4.

Participants then responded to the questions about
competition (“How cooperative or competitive would
you feel toward your archrival?” 1 = cooperative, 7 = competitive), the importance of doing well relative to rival
(“How important would it be for you to out-compete
your archrival?” 1 = not important, 7 = very important),
and the perceived difference in rank (“So, you are
ranked #3 and your archrival is ranked #4. How big is
the difference in rank?” 1 = small, 7 = large). On the second page, participants read about intermediate rankings, “Now, imagine that you are ranked #303 out of
500 . . . [archrival] is ranked #304.” Participants then
responded to the three questions above. The order of
presentation also was counterbalanced such that the
first page was about intermediate rankings.
In addition to this within-subjects factor (RANK: high/
intermediate), we also controlled for ranking position as
a between-subjects factor (POSITION: one above/one
below), in which the self was ranked just one below the
rival (e.g., self #4/rival #3 and self #304/rival #303).
Results and Discussion
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on the
competition, importance, and difference measures by Rank
and Position. As expected, there was no significant
Rank × Position interaction for any of these three measures (all ps > .3). Thus, the implication is that these
ranking effects are the same whether just one above or
below one’s rival. However, participants did express
more competitive behavior with high rankings (M =
4.93, SD = 1.55) than intermediate ones (M = 3.27, SD =
1.64), F(1, 82) = 52.4, p < .001), felt it was more important to do well with high rankings (M = 4.95, SD = 1.66)
than intermediate ones (M = 3.72, SD = 1.80),
F(1, 82) = 26.6, p < .001), and felt the difference in rank
was greater with high rankings (M = 3.92, SD = 2.11) than
intermediate ones (M = 2.18, SD = 1.55), F(1, 82) = 41.3,
p < .001. These results suggest the people become more
competitive and feel it is even more important to do well
with high rankings than intermediate ones. We also note
that, in this within-subjects design, participants, not
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surprisingly, recognized the difference in rank as being
greater with high rankings than intermediate ones.
To examine the unique relationship that importance
has with competition, irrespective of the perceived difference in commensurability, we conducted two sets of
partial correlations focused on the ratings in the highrankings and intermediate rankings conditions. For the
high rankings condition, we correlated importance and
competition while controlling for difference. As predicted, the relationship between importance and competition was strong and highly significant (r = .60, p < .001),
suggesting that participants’ importance ratings in highrankings condition were directly related to their competition ratings, even while controlling for the perceived
difference in commensurability. We also conducted the
identical analysis using the participants’ rating in the
intermediate rankings condition. Again, importance and
competition were significantly correlated, even when controlling for the perceived difference in commensurability
(r = .44, p < .001). Thus, Studies 7 and 8 together suggest
that proximity to the standard directly affects the importance of doing well and that the importance of doing well
has a direct impact on competitive behavior; this psychological mechanism is not contingent on a perceived difference in commensurability.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The social comparison literature has generally
assumed that the level of competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually relevant dimension is
fixed (e.g., Goethals, 1986; Goethals & Darley, 1977;
Tesser, 1988). However, across multiple measures,
across various contexts of interest to our participants,
and across between- and within-subjects designs, the
present analyses reveal how varying the rivals’ distance
from the standard can in turn vary this fundament
process and competition itself. Studies 1 to 3 showed
that high rankings, relative to intermediate ones,
intensify competition, as indicated by an increase in
competitive feelings, an increase in the pain of social
comparison, and a reduction in the willingness to
trade off disadvantageous inequality to maximize joint
gains. Studies 4 to 6 revealed that this apparent high
ranking effect is a far more general phenomenon, due
not to rankings per se but rather to the standards that
such rankings represent, because competition intensifies only when rankings coincide with a standard.
Studies 7 and 8 began examining the psychological
mechanisms underlying this standard effect, providing evidence that proximity to the standard directly

impacts the unidirectional drive upward itself, as
measured by the importance of doing well.
Theoretical Implications
Our ranking analysis fundamentally changes the
conventional view of competition. Social psychologists
have long recognized the importance of factors such as
the relevance of the dimension at hand (Festinger,
1954; Tesser, 1988) and the commensurability of rivals
(Goethals & Darley, 1977). Yet, social psychologists, as
well as experimental economists (e.g., Kagel & Roth,
1995), have generally assumed that the “unidirectional
drive upward” is fixed, either present or absent (e.g.,
Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Tesser, 1988),
when relevance and commensurability are held constant. Our ranking analysis, however, introduces a new
factor germane to our understanding of competition:
the distance from a standard. By varying rivals’ distance
from a standard, we directly manipulate the central unidirectional drive and, in turn, the degree of competitive behavior.
Although the proximity to the standard largely and
dramatically appears to lead to a direct impact on the
unidirectional drive upward, we do note when people are
under joint evaluation (Bazerman et al., 1992; Camerer,
1995), where people can systematically compare differences as in Study 8, the perceived difference in commensurability was perceived to be larger amid high
rankings than intermediate ones. Although Studies 4 to
8 dismiss a pure psychophysics mechanism, an interesting question for social comparison theory remains.
That is, according to the related attributes hypothesis
(Goethals & Darley, 1977), the more commensurate the
rivals, the greater the competition. However, the exact
opposite pattern appears in Study 8. The more commensurate rivals were intermediately ranked ones, and
they were less competitive. Thus, one interesting implication is that one’s proximity to a standard can become
so strong, the upward motivational force so strong, that
issues of commensurability matter less in the proximity
of a standard.
Despite these theoretical implications, one could question whether our decision-making methodology is appropriate for the hypotheses examined in the present
studies. As Daniel Kahneman (2000) explained, however,
The answer is that choice . . . is the fruit fly of decision
theory. It is a very simple case, which contains many
essential elements of much larger problems. As with the
fruit fly, we . . . hope that the principles that govern the
simple case will extend in recognizable form to complex situations. (p. xi)
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We believe this statement legitimately applies to the
trade-offs examined in the present analysis.
Implications for Social Capital
The present analysis also helps contribute to a
broader discourse within the social sciences on social
capital (see Putnam, 2000)—the value of social networks (e.g., Burt, 1992). Although economists, political
scientists, sociologists, and others have been vocal on
this issue, social psychologists have been mute on this
debate, if not unaware, even though cooperation—the
currency of social capital—is a topic with deep roots in
social psychology.
The present analysis, however, broaches the possibility that rankings may have unintended, perhaps even
deleterious, effects on cooperation. Our results suggest
that people with high ranks are much less willing to
cooperate, even when such collaborations have the
potential to maximize profit or some other utility. Notably
too, as mentioned above, we have demonstrated this
effect in artificial situations. Although the effect size
appears large under these conservative circumstances,
one can only imagine how these results might understate the effect in the real world, where many highly
ranked individuals are even more likely to be competitive as a function of self-selection than intermediately
ranked individuals. Given this gross confound, making
ranking information more salient among highly ranked,
real-world rivals would likely further impede mutually
beneficial collaborations. From a social capital perspective, rankings can thwart the development of cooperative
networks, and the negative correlation between competition and socializing with others (Crocker, Luhtanen,
Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003) further underscores this
point.
Conclusion
Rankings that coincide with a standard intensify
the social comparison process to a greater extent than
rankings that do not. Although the theoretical implications help uncover a new direction in social comparison
research, the findings reported here simultaneously
broaden our understanding of competition. The
degree of competition between commensurate rivals on
a mutually relevant dimension is not fixed but rather
dynamic because “the unidirectional drive upward”
fluctuates according to the rivals’ distance from a standard. On a broader level, the present analysis uncovers
a potentially important disadvantage of today’s prevalent
ranking culture for beneficial cooperation: Rankings
can sometimes impede progress on the very performance
dimensions they seek to enhance.
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NOTE
1. Because the binary logistic regression assumes that the
responses (Strategy A/Strategy B) are independent, we could not use
this procedure in this within-subjects design. The appropriate statistical
test to analyze these correlated binary responses is the Generalized
Estimating Equations (GEE) analysis (Liang & Zeger, 1986). We conducted our GEE analyses by using the REPEATED statement in the
GENMOD procedure in SAS.
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